Facilitating Communications and Murder: Operation Condor and United States Complicity by Editor, IBPP
International Bulletin of Political 
Psychology 
Volume 10 Issue 10 Article 3 
3-23-2001 
Facilitating Communications and Murder: Operation Condor and 
United States Complicity 
Editor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International 
Relations Commons, Latin American Studies Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Military, War, and 
Peace Commons, Other Political Science Commons, Other Psychology Commons, Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons, and the Terrorism Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Editor (2001) "Facilitating Communications and Murder: Operation Condor and United States Complicity," 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 10 : Iss. 10 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol10/iss10/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
International Bulletin of Political Psychology  
1 
 
Title: Facilitating Communications and Murder: Operation Condor and United States Complicity 
Author: Editor  
Volume: 10 
Issue: 10 
Date: 2001-03-23 
Keywords: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Conspiracy, Operation Condor, Paraguay, Uruguay 
 
Abstract. This article explores levels of United States Government (USG) complicity during the late 1970s 
in the murder of individuals alleged to have been left-wing opponents of South American, right-wing, 
authoritarian governments. 
 
A number of journalistic and advocacy sources have alleged that the USG facilitated communications 
among the representatives of South American, right-wing, authoritarian government intelligence chiefs. 
This facilitation is said to have been especially egregious during the late 1970s when the chiefs were 
jointly working to capture, torture, interrogate, and murder individuals alleged to be members of left-
wing groups opposing their respective governments. This joint covert program--known as Operation 
Condor--is often judged to represent the antithesis of USG promulgated values of free speech, freedom 
of association, democracy, and inalienable human rights. 
 
A 1978 cable from the US Embassy in Asuncion to the Office of the US Secretary of State in Washington--
a cable that was at one time confidential but later downgraded to unclassified--is purportedly the 
smoking gun of USG complicity. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the cable describe the essence of Operation 
Condor: the involvement of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay; a fight to the death 
against "subversion;" and a commitment to hand over "subversives" apprehended in one country to the 
government of the country viewing the individual as a threat. Paragraph 3 also states that the 
governments communicate on these matters (in code) through a US communication installation in the 
Panama Canal Zone. The paragraph goes on to state that the installation is (1) used mainly by student 
officers to call home, (2) also used to coordinate intelligence about South American countries of the 
"Southern Cone," and (3) viewed (by the US diplomat writing the cable) as practically useless and serving 
to inflate the importance of the various Operation Condor intelligence chiefs. Paragraph 4 asserts that 
the USG has been aware of Operation Condor "over the last few years." The concluding paragraph states 
that if a US communications installation is being used for Operation Condor, then a USG review would 
be necessary to assure that its continuation is in US interests. 
 
Certainly, there is information in the cable (if authentic and accurate) with which to damn the USG--
especially that the USG has known about Operation Condor but has apparently not seriously tried to end 
it. Of course, even the latter conclusion is based only on the omission of any information about attempts 
to end it or the consequences of these attempts. There is no information on the active facilitation of 
Operation Condor by the USG--instead only what may be monitored or unmonitored usage of a 
communications asset by South American officers with putatively little operational import of any kind. If 
anything, the usage might be more rightly presented as an intelligence opportunity for the USG to 
influence these and officers in a manner consonant with US interests. 
 
The overinflation of US complicity based on the cable can only impede efforts to identify and resolve 
matters of past human rights violations and impede those of the future. This overinflation may have a 
number of psychological sources including intentional misrepresentation, anti-US and anti-USG cognitive 
schemata, diabolical causation schema (Kofta, 1995), the unconscious dynamics of oppression 
(Schofield, 1999), conspiracy mania (Quinby, 1999), various individual difference variables of personality 
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(Abalakina-Paap, et al, 1999), availability heuristics, preservation of enhancement of self-esteem and 
self-image, enmeshment in ethnosociological narrative (Waters, 1997), a Bayesian analysis that larger 
conspiracies are more instrumentally effective than smaller ones (McCauley & Jacques, 1979), and base 
rates of conspiracies of silence among holders of political power in various sociocultural contexts 
(Quadrio, 1994). Basic and applied research on such sources can enrich scientific psychology as well as 
contribute to human rights. (See Abalakina-Papp, M., Stephan, W.G., Craig, T., & Gregory, W.L. (1999). 
Beliefs in conspiracies. Political Psychology, 20, 637-647; Kofta, M. (1995). Stereotype of a group as a 
whole: The role of diabolical causation schema. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 26, 83-96; McCauley, C., & 
Jacques, S. (1979). The popularity of conspiracy theories of presidential assassination: A Bayesian 
analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 637-644; Quadrio, C. (1994). Sexual abuse 
involving therapists, clergy, and judiciary: Closed ranks, collusions, and conspiracies of silence. 
Psychiatry, Psychology, and Law, 1, 189-198; Quinby, L. (1999). Millennial civilization and its discontents: 
Terminal cynicism, conspiracy mania, and avatarism. Psychohistory Review, 27, 33-46; Schofield, G. 
(1999). Unconscious dynamics of oppression. Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, 4, 
318-322; Second meeting with Chief of Staff re Letelier case. (131905Z Oct 78). FM AMEMBASSY 
ASUNCION TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4266; U.S. diplomatic cable on Operation Condor. 
(March 6, 2001). SECRECY NEWS; Waters, A.M. (1997). Conspiracy theories as ethnosociologies: 
Explanation and intention in African American political culture. Journal of Black Studies, 28, 112-125.) 
(Keywords: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Conspiracy, Operation Condor, Paraguay, Uruguay.) 
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